REVIEWS by unknown
REVIEWS
THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE: CONSTITUTION. By Benjamin Fletcher
Wright, Jr. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938. Pp. xvii, 287.
$3.50.
PROFESSOR WRIGHT has given us a book which will satisfy neither the
conservatives nor the radicals among constitutional scholars. Several re-
viewers have already accused him of a bias against the Supreme Court, and
at least one has dismissed his book as failing to go beyond legalistic tradition.
That he has produced a useful book no one can deny. Among the great con-
stitutional doctrines, that of the immunity of the obligation of contracts from
impairment by state laws has never had an adequate historian. Wright has
been through the cases, sifted some five hundred, classified them and studied
their sequential relation. He prefaces this by a detailed study of the probable
intentions of the constitutional framers; he has some -valid if unoriginal
things to say about Marshall's role in the creation of the judicial doctrine,
and some more original if perhaps less valid things to say about Taney's
role. He has brought to his task patience, a capacity for detail, and a fresh
critical intelligence that is not content to accept any tradition of scholarship
without re-examination.
But whatever importance the' book has lies beyond the confines of such
craftsmanship. If Wright had merely meant to produce one of those tomes
that professors turn out to appease their consciences and their presidents,
I should have ended this review at the first paragraph and spent the time
thus saved on one of Agatha Christie's latest mystery thrillers. Wright has,
by his own avowals, aimed at something beyond the genealogy of legalisms.
His introduction is a prospectus full of exciting anticipations. He speaks of
the "extraordinary importance" of the clause "in the growth of American
industrial society ;" he points out that "the period of its vigor is that of the
growth of the corporate form of industrial organization ;" he mentions the
"major role" it has played "in our economic as well as our constitutional
history;" he promises the portrayal of "the role of the Supreme Court as
a governing body in American life;" and he locates his study "somewhere
on the undefinable and overlapping borders of constitutional and economic
history."
Introductions are almost always unfortunate: an author puts into them
what he fears the book itself has failed to make clear; they are generally the
graveyards of unrealized hopes. To an extent this is true of Wright's book.
I say "to an extent." If there were an SEC to pass judgment on scholarly
prospectuses, I should defend this one on the ground that the achievement
of the book itself was enough to get it inside the ropes of legality. And as
part of my proof I should point to some of the reviews. Professor Dowling,
writing in the Harvard Law Reviewjis slightly saddened when Wright goes
beyond the cases into economics; and his sadness is linked with a suspicion
that in leaving the trim walks of case law Wright means to show up Marshall
and the Court. Professor Crosskey, writing in the Journal of Political Econ-
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onzy, is more than saddened when Wright starts ahead of the cases with the
intentions of the constitutional framers and thus ventures into the history
of ideas. He spends almost the whole of a longish review subjecting this
part of W~right's scholarship to a raking cross-fire, and arguing that the
drafting committee intended the clause to be broad and not limited. He accuses
Wright of being "misled by certain preconceptions as to the sort of Consti-
tution that the Fathers gave us," and then reveals his own when he invokes
despairingly among us all "some faint, incipient tremors of suspicion, that,
perhaps, possibly, after all, the Fathers may have intended us to be a nation."
Evidently Wright, to the extent that he has ventured into the area of the
economic context of the decisions and into the area of the history of consti-
tutional ideas, has drawn blood.
But the problem remains of how effective he has been in these areas beyond
irritating the stricter traditionalists. As a study in the history of ideas, the
book lacks the historical imagination that might have sent the author off the
beaten track in quest of the roots, both social and ideological, of the decisions
and their actual consequences. It lacks richness of texture, that sense at once
of the complexity of American institutional history and of the cleaving social
logic which can hack a path through that complexity. One might place this
book beside a study such as Walton Hamilton has done of the history of the
maxim of caveat enzptor, or of the doctrine of industry affected with a public
interest or of due process, and bring out the difference between a competent
job and a significant essay in the history of ideas. This is not to deny some
real insights that Mr. Wright has given us. Despite Professor Crosskey's
strictures, I find Wright's version of the origin of the contract clause the
more persuasive of the two. Wright is also justified in opposing the usual
view that the Taney court reversed the MIarshall interpretation of the contract
clause. But in opposing this view, Wright finds himself carried too far in the
opposite direction; and one gets a picture, which is not a true one, of Tanev's
economic philosophy as almost indistinguishable from that of Marshall. After
Taney, the book ceases to be doctrinal history and becomes an analytical dis-
section of the court's views on various phases of the contract clause.
Something of the same criticism can be made when one views the book as
a study in the relation between law and economics. I suspect that when
Wright speaks of his study as "somewhere on the undefinable and overlapping
borders of constitutional and economic history" he carries over the implied
sense of vagueness and imprecision into his work itself. It is not enough,
as Professor Mark Howe has pointed out in a review of the book,.1 for a
constitutional scholar today to speak of breaking through the traditional
boundaries separating lawyers from other social scientists. The sense of
emancipation and of the breaking of barriers is a pervasive one today. The
question is always whether a new illumination is achieved in the process.
It would take an enormous amount of research to do a significant piece of
work of this sort in the vast field covered by the contract clause. The work
of research has yet to be done on most of the justices whom Professor Wright
discusses and on most of the leading decisions. Any one who has had the
experience of digging into the thought of even a single Justice in detail, or
1. N. Y. Herald-Tribune Books, Nov. 27, 1939, p. 22.
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the economic context and consequences of even a single decision, will know
how treacherous and difficult the task is. On the whole, I have the impression
that Mr. Wright has not in either the Marshall or the Taney chapters dug up
very much that is new. He missed, for example, in his discussion of Fletcher
v. Peck perhaps the most revealing treatment of the economics and sociology
of the case, written by Forrest R. Morgan in an obscure magazire, Americana.
And, moving away from the problem of detailed research, he has failed to
give us the sweep of economic history which would enable us to give per-
spective to the economic meaning of the sequence of contract decisions.
If I have been exacting in my analysis of the book's shortcomings, it is
because I have used as criteria the high intentions that the author has him-
self expressed. Judged by the more usual criteria of clarity, cogency, crafts-
manship, the book deserves high praise. But if progress is to be made in
constitutional study, Mr. Wright is justified in aiming at more than he
attains. He has posed the problem of an economicrlegal study of the contract
clause even when he has not resolved it. The students who come after him
will have to be more articulate and more precise in the very area in which
Mr. Wright is vague- that of economic motivations and consequences and
of the idea systems based upon them. They will set themselves the task of
inquiring into the interest groups involved in each important case, the
economic stakes, the psychological tensions in which the decisions were made,
the pull of class interest and the pull of intellectual tradition, the economic
imperatives which forced the decisions to march in the direction they did,
and the area of choice that was left even within the framework of these im-
peratives. This is a difficult task, and one far easier to map out, in a grand
manner, than to apply in the detailed analysis of a specific doctrine like the
contract clause. But unless doctrinal studies are made with imagination and
concreteness along the lines not only of legal but also of economic analysis,
we shall never be much wiser than we are about the relations between judicial
review and American capitalism.
MAX LERNERt
Williamstown, Massachusetts.
TECHNOLOGY OF LABOR. A Study of the Human Problems of Labor Saving.
By Elliott Dunlap Smith and Richmond Carter Nyman. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1939. Pp. xiv, 222. $2.50.
FOR many years Professor Elliott Dunlap Smith and his able collaborator,
Mr. Richmond C. Nyman, have been painstakingly collecting and analyzing
a mass of data on the "stretch-out" in textiles. In their slim volume, they
have made available a summary of their conclusions; but little indication is
given of the magnitude of the task involved. Except for a brief description
on the jacket of the methods employed in the survey and a relatively infre-
"Professor of Political Science, Williams College.
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quent use of illustrative examples in the text, a careless reader might almost
assume that the authors had reached their conclusions by pure speculation.
To the extent that there are grounds for this impression, it is doubly un-
fortunate. First, it makes the book somewhat less readable than it would
have been if the author had permitted himself more space for illustrative
evidence. There is a tendency toward abstraction which is not always easy
to follow. Second, the central conclusions are such that they might easily
be accepted on a priori grounds without supporting evidence by any liberal
and intelligent employer, labor leader, or student of industrial relations. What
seems to me important is not so much the conclusions as the fact that they
are supported by a mountain of evidence. A missionary in the field of
industrial relations does not need the conclusions - they are likely to be the
assumptions upon which his daily sermons rest. What the missionary wants
is the statistics, the stories, the case studies, the methodology in which his
hypotheses may be factually grounded. Professor Smith has been over-modest
in telling the industrial world how much work he and Mr. Nyman have done.
This is the worst that I can say about Technology and Labor. I have
probably overstated the case since for a few years I was privileged to watch
the compilation of "stretch-out" case studies and the intricate methods by
which they were analyzed. Most readers will probably not feel, therefore,
the sense of bereavement which I experience over the continued interment
of so many useful facts and figures in the filing cabinets of the Institute of
Human Relations.
Professor Smith's central conclusion is that in the introduction of techno-
logical change there is a large area of identity of interest between manage-
ment' and labor. Management and labor may gain or lose together depend-
ing upon the manner in which the technological change is introduced. In
many of the cases studied, management, in pursuit of greater profit or in an
effort to avoid further losses, attempted to introduce changes without ade-
quately consulting the interests of labor. The results were disastrous both
to management and labor. In other cases, management vms scrupulously
considerate of the effect of the change upon workers. The results were
beneficial to management and to those workers who remained employed
after the change. There is no implied conclusion here that management and
labor gain or lose equally from technological advance. Neither does it follow
that no workers will suffer as a result of the change. Nor, finally, can it
be concluded that there is no diversity of interest between the two groups.
But it can be -emphatically stated that they have in common a far larger area
of interest than was apparently realized by a significantly large group of
managements among those studied.
Stated thus, there is nothing startling about this conclusion. But Professor
Smith is able to show in detail the manner in which some managements,
by disregarding this truism, failed disastrously while others, by attending
to employee-interests, succeeded. One set of workers' interests lies in avoid-
ing the physical or mental strain which may result from technological change.
Another lies in avoiding possible unemployment. A third lies in winning
1. The term "management" is here used to include "ownership" although there may,
of course, be a great deal of difference between the twvo.
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some share of the gain for themselves in the form either of increased earnings
or of shorter hours. The question which Professor Smith is setting himself
is this: "To what extent is management interested in these same objectives ?"
He raises the question in detail in connection with the avoidance of physical
or mental strain. He applies it briefly to the matter of unemployment. And
he raises it only by indirection in the case of wages and hours.
The answer to the question, "Should management, in pursuit of its own
interests, avoid overstraining its employees ?" is flat and conclusive. It should.
If it does not, the results will be spoiled goods, conscious or unconscious
sabotage, high labor turn-over, strikes, the destruction of community morale,
red ink on the annual report and bankruptcy -any or all. Professor Smith
makes it clear that it is as useless to "blame" labor for behaving in this
manner as it would be to blame water for boiling at 212 degrees Fahrenheit
at sea level. The facts are that textile labor in large masses over a considerable
period of time, usually without leadership and often without apparent con-
scious design, has behaved in just this way. From a cold-blooded profit-
making point of view, any management which persists in overlooking this
is determined to commit financial hara-kiri. Mr. Smith puts it much more
dispassionately, but the moral is hard to miss.
How does a manager avoid imposing physical and mental over-strain upon
his employees? The answer is as intricate as a blue-print for a submarine.
It involves improvement in raw materials, changes in the routing of the
productive process, careful planning of the time, extent and tempo of the
change, patience, tact, deliberation and intelligence, consideration of the in-
fluence of habit, customs, personalities, prevailing attitudes, pride, prestige,
and so on. This is not a catalog. It's a few samples of the factors involved.
I read this section of Professor Smith's book with an awed respect for the
managers who correctly handled these factors and for the two social scientists
who tabulated and analyzed them.
On the question of unemployment, Professor Smith's book is not so satis-
factory. It is not intended to be. He concedes that technological change may
result in unemployment within the industry or in industrial society as a whole.
He does not defend the classical thesis of automatic reemployment through
the price mechanism. He does make a valid point, however, of the fact that
many difficulties may be avoided through eliminating jobs no more rapidly
than the working force can be reduced by stopping the employment of new
workers and allowing the normal quit-rate to continue. In this way the
psychological consequences of positive disemployment can be avoided - and
these are serious to workers, management and the community. Moreover,
it imposes gradualism upon management and increases the probabilities of
reabsorption of workers negatively displaced. And it practically compels
management to introduce the change during good times, when quit-rates are
relatively high and the opportunities for quick reabsorption relatively great.
Although Professor Smith has many illuminating comments to make upon
the question of wages and hours, he intentionally sidesteps the basic issue
as to the extent of the identity of employer-labor interests in these matters.
He is content to accept the general level of wages and hours as being set
by the broad controls of competition or government regulation - controls
[Vol. 49
REVIEWS
over which the individual management has scant influence. By direct com-
ment and by implication, however, he makes it clear that "mental strain" is
a very broad category. If management wants to make money it must handle
the whole wages and hours question in such a way as not to set up either
physical or psychological strains which will in the short or long run be
expensive. Mr. Smith makes some detailed and practical suggestions.
Relatively unrelated to the main thesis are many of Mr. Smith's most
interesting observations: labor extension paves the way for industrial union-
ism. The new techniques of management increase the necessity for a clear
medium of two-way communication between management and workers. The
prerequisites for successful management are so severe and technical that they
increasingly require formal training. The ladder of industrial ascension leads
to the schools rather than through the plant. Human relations in industry
form a fabric so delicate that infinite pains are required to avoid its rupture.
Honesty in industrial relations is not only the best policy, it's the only policy.
This last may be hard to believe. It's a little threadbare. But if faith needs
refurbishing with facts, read Technology and Labor. If you still don't believe
it, persuade Mr. Nyman to let you see those case studies and those beautiful
charts-all in color, as I remember them.
Professor Smith has written about an industry which, at the time of the
research, was almost completely non-union. In such an industry, his book is
directed primarily toward management. It is management which must be
sold the idea of worker-employer identity of interest. Upon management rests
the responsibility for doing the job. As the textile industry and others of
equal importance approach complete unionization, however, the responsibility
will shift toward the labor leader who must share it with management. Where
organized labor is not merely fighting for status, but actually enjoys power,
this book is required reading. I could wish, for example, that in the current
Chrysler dispute the leaders of both sets of interests would take a day off
and read Technology and Labor. It goes almost without saying that to the
student of contemporary industrial relations the book is indispensable.
RODERT R. R. BnooKst
Williamstown, 'Massachusetts.
THE LAW AID AMR. SMITH. By Max Radin. Indianapolis and New York:
The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1938. Pp. 333.
THE Smith addressed by Professor Radin is an individual of somewhat
varying age and intelligence. In Chapter One and some other places he is
obviously Master Smith, to whom very simple stories are told to show him
the beginnings and present-day operations of law. At some places lie is pre-
sumably more of a scholar than the Smith Brothers we know. At many other
places, he is apparently assumed to be no better posted on the data of com-
t Professor of Economics, Williams College.
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parative jurisprudence and legal theory than most of the somewhat intel-
lectually interested Smiths we meet (or are) at ordinary alumni gatherings
and faculty meetings.
What will this Mr. Smith get out of Professor Radin's book? Not much
help in the practical utilization of the law. He is not told how to draw a
will, make a lease or take care of himself in court. Indeed, an apparent aim
of Professor Radin is to increase rather than decrease Smith's sense of
dependence upon legal experts. He patiently explains how and why rules of
law- as distinguished from rules of religion, morality, custom or fashion-
first appeared among primitive men; how and why the task of saying what
these rules are became gradually the task of particular individuals, supported
by the organized power of the community; how these public officials find out
what the rules are and why we must employ specially trained private persons
either to guess what the officials are going to find the rules of law to be or
else to persuade them to find what we want them to find. Lawyers, we are
finally convinced in the next to last chapter (entitled "Lawyers Should Be
Abolished"), should not be abolished. In the course of this demonstration,
the author considers how far judges are able to admit notions of what is
just and good into what they say the law is; why they follow no precise and
constant course in this; what are the common, or nearly common, elements
in the legal systems of different places and times; at what stages and in what
ways procedure becomes predominant in the life of the law; and how we
get particular elements in the substance and method of our laws of tort, con-
tracts, property and crime. Professor Radin sets this forth vividly, with a
variety of historical and anthropological illustrations. He has written a highly
interesting and useful book.
Yet the Smith now speaking has two complaints. One is against Professor
Radin's prevailing assumption that he removes our frequent wonder and
dismay over the behavior of our judges and lawyers, by effectively showing
us how inevitable are most of the demands these persons undertake to meet
and how naturally and gradually they have fallen into some of their char-
acteristic ways of serving those demands. But on the one hand, we have
not often doubted that judges and lawyers are needed; and, on the other hand,
even after reading this book we shall probably continue to wonder why our
public and private legal guides delay, mislead and confuse us so much in
their work of applying law to the settlement of issues affecting our private
and public interests. As to the law and public policy (and Smith not only
has some public-spirited interest in legal decisions on public policy but also
recognizes that the manner of reaching such decisions often affects his private
interest) Professor Radin has almost nothing to say. He throws no light
on the question of judicial versus legislative or administrative discretion; "the
law" that he explains to Smith leaves out administrative law and due process
of law. Thus, generally, Professor Radin fails to supply much information
or reassurance on one of Smith's major worries about the law - that a govern-
ment of laws gives us so troublesome and uncertain a government of men.
The other complaint is that, in his effort to enlighten us by striking com-
parisons and contrasts, Professor Radin seems (at a very few places) need-
lessly to overstate his case. Thus in the introductory pages of the chapter
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on "Crime and Punishment," he makes a discrimination, with considerable
emphasis and repetition, between early and late communities with respect to
their dealings with conflicts between private individuals-John inflicting bodily
injury on Jehu, Robinson trespassing on Smith's lands, Jones snatching
Brown's purse (to use Professor Radin's examples). The notion that the
community should concern itself with such acts is, the author says, "relatively
late in arising"; in early communities, "if one individual injured another, that
was a matter between them." As for our Anglo-American legal tradition,
Professor Radin partly supplies his own correction for such sweeping state-
ments; for he shows that among the ancient and medieval mid-European
peoples from whom we derive much of our criminal law, the same act might
be both a private injury for which the wrong-doer had to pay compensation
to the injured person, and a violation of "the peace," for which he was
punished directly by public authorities. He might have added that the early
Germanic codes contained elaborate rules, defined and enforced by public
authorities, regulating the "private" compensation to be paid for the "private"
wrong. Moreover, he might also have said that in some primitive groups,
property disputes and acts of assault, trespass, and theft are dealt with directly
by the community or by those exercising authority for the community. Indeed
the writings of anthropologists suggest to Smith that among many primitive
peoples the ordinary native lives very much in the public eye, and the com-
munity officially concerns itself with the most neighborly squabbles and
maraudings of John and Jehu.
These are minor complaints against a learned, brilliantly written, slightly
soothing explanation of some important matters of the law.
FRANCIS W. COKER4
New Haven, Connecticut.
FEDERAL ADmINISTRATORS. By Arthur W. Macmahon and John D. Millett.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1939. Pp. XIV, 524. $4.50.
THIas pioneering book presents, for probably the first time, an over-all pic-
ture of the intricate structure of the Federal Government in terms of the men
who make it work. Biographical sketches are dovetailed with the complex
organization and functioning of the federal departments. Mlen who are the
heroes of the press and the columnists are mentioned, but the primary empha-
sis is on the larger group of unsung men who are the life-blood of the Gov-
ernment. Here one finds more said about William H. McReynolds and Ebert
K. Burlew than about Henry Morgenthau, Jr., and Harold L. Ickes.
The Government of these United States is coming of age when the shroud
of anonymity is dropped from the McRevnolds' and they become heroes
between covers. Anonymity has its uses for career personnel who serve across
changing administrations. At the present stage of the development of the
1 Chairman of Department of Government, Graduate School, Yale University.
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career service too much public fame in one administration might well result
to the disadvantage of a career servant upon a change in administration.
But publicity and fame for career servants also has its uses. By concen-
trating on the personalities of some of our leading career men, in the light
of the work they do, the authors lead us to face and partially solve one of
the basic problems confronting the Government.
With the rapid expansion of the Government's activities in many new
fields and the increasing complexity of the tasks to be done, the problem of
getting superior personnel is a crucial one. The depression, the contracting
opportunities in private life, greater security of public positions, and a grow-
ing realization of the nature and importance of the problems of Government
have already started to bring many men into the Government who might
otherwise not have gone into it. By dramatizing those who have come to the
top in an emerging career service, this book will strengthen the forces already
at work for attracting some of the "best brains" of the country to such a
service. It doubtless will do a good deal more for the service than the host
of books about the more general and abstract features of the civil service.
Its example probably will and should be the forerunner of other personalized
books on career men-particularly those younger men who are now in the
levels below the top grades.
Some of the awareness of the problems and opportunities in Government
which this book gives may be of particular interest to lawyers and lawyers-
to-be. The number of younger lawyers who took comparatively minor posts
and then came back in important non-career positions with the Government
is far higher than a chance distribution. Roswell Magill, Arthur A. Ballan-
tine, John Bassett Moore and Thomas D. Thacher are only a few of the
lawyers who returned to important positions. Perhaps their earlier expe-
riences gave them an interest in and an awareness of Government that had
something to do with their return. As the authors also point out, roughly
about two-thirds of the career men who are now bureau chiefs have been in
the professional service. This is a natural trend. In actual life, law and ad-
ministration are closely interrelated. Hardly an administrative problem exists
that does not present some legal question. At least the many lawyers, who
are now administrators in the career service of the Government, are better
able to spot the many legal problems involved in administration.
The chances are that if the lawyers are covered into the competitive classi-
fied civil service more and more lawyers will turn administrators. Trans-
ferring from one branch of the competitive service to another is a more likely
occurrence than the transfer from an exempt to a civil service. For those
lawyers who have a knack for administration, the opportunities may be even
greater in the administrative service than in the legal service. It happens, at
the present time, that the lawyers on the whole have better training and are
likely to have wider experience in dealing with administrative problems than
even the administrators in comparable grades. But the administrators, par-
ticularly in the top levels, have greater power and as interesting-if not more
interesting-work than the lawyers in the same level. It may well be, there-
fore, that lawyers in a career service in the Government, who have an aptitude
for administration, would in reality have two avenues open to them.
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Although the main task of most of the lawyers as well as the administrators
in the Government is supposedly to execute and administer policy, they do in
fact participate, in varying degrees, in its formulation. Unfortunately, this
presents a problem which the authors do not face head on. The problem is
how to get the continuous services of superior personnel and at the same
time to have a Government that is responsive to the changing needs of a
democracy. Continuous and trained administrative competence is indispen-
sable, even in a period of change, because of the complexity of the Govern-
ment mechanism. One has but to compare the functioning of the N.R.A.
with some of the newer activities of the Treasury to see that an able and
enlightened conservatism as to the administrative feasibility of certain pro-
posals may be something quite different from bureaucratic obstructionism.
Personal relationships between career men in different departments also aid
greatly in getting things done-be they old or new things.
But given a permanent staff of legal and administrative experts with bents
that are different than the prevailing views of a majority of the public, the
permanent staff can effectively influence the policy of a department despite
the different -iews of the ordinary non-career cabinet member or general
counsel. Government in this country today is so complex and far-flung that
it is impossible for non-experts temporarily in the cabinet or other policy-
making positions to make independent studies and reach independent
judgments on the great bulk of questions which arise from day to
day. To a large extent, reliance is and necessarily must be placed on the
experts on the staff. Ordinarily the influence of such experts is along the
beaten track. New ideas are seldom given a ready reception by a bureau-
cracy. Gladstone stated this phase of the problem when he said that he could
not remember a single administrative reform which the experts did not oppose
when he first proposed it. Only in those rare cases where the cabinet member,
general counsel or other policy-making official is well trained in the highly
specialized character of the work in his department, a prodigious worker or
an unusual administrator, can he successfully control the views and behavior
of his career service personnel.
As Thomas Huxley put it some sixty years ago, the apparent question on
this score is "whether shifting corruption is better than permanent bureau-
cracy." Those, however, are only the poles of opposites. Conceivably a com-
promise can be made between them by eliminating most of the disadvantages
of shifting corruption and obtaining most of the advantages of a perma-
nent bureaucracy of experts. Resistance to change is probably in part a
function of intelligence and economic standing. If a career service is made up
of people with a high order of intelligence and drawn from the poor and
those of moderate means as well as the rich, part of the evils of a permanent
bureaucracy may well be minimized. Also, if capable elected or appointed
non-expert officials in the top jobs direct and utilize the services of an adapta-
ble permanent career service made up of trained experts, we may reach an
effective compromise. Although the authors do not directly point up this
problem, their book may well help in a solution of it by attracting the kind
of competence that is necessary to work out this compromise.
Read in the particular light of the doings of the President's Committee on
Civil Service Improvement-the so-called Reed Committee--this book pre-
19391
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
sents several new slants on the careers for lawyers qua lawyers in the Govern-
ment Service. At the present time the Federal Government is the world's
largest client. There are now approximately 5,400 legal positions in the fed-
eral service. Of this number only about 930 are now in the competitive clas-
sified civil service. The rest are still in the class exempted from the com-
petitive civil service. The exempted class can be covered into the competitive
civil service either by presidential executive order or by statute. If most or all
of the lawyers, with the exception of presidential appointees, or those in
policy-making positions, are recommended for covering in by the Reed Com-
mittee, then we shall probably have a permanent career service for most of
the Government's lawyers. With this possibility of a career service for law-
yers in the Government both as lawyers and alternately as administrators, it
should behoove lawyers and potential lawyers, who are interested, to get
some informed knowledge about the present trends in the Federal Govern-
ment service. This book will give it to them.
OSCAR Cox t
Washington, D. C.
CASES ON MORTGAGES. Second Edition. By Morton C. Campbell. St. Paul:
West Publishing Co., 1939. Pp. xxii, 794.
Tirls is a second edition of the Cases on Mortgages of Real Property by
Professor Morton C. Campbell of Harvard Law School. It is intended to
provide material for a course of thirty-two lectures. The editor states in the
preface that it has been his practice to select certain chapters for treatment
in a particular year, varying from year to year. Recent developments in
the law of mortgages furnish the justification for the second edition, namely,
the cases of the last few years relating to mortgages for future advances,
mortgages of income, seizure of income of real estate through receiverships,
and cases dealing with the competition between mortgages of real estate and
liens on chattels annexed or attached thereto. A number of late cases dealing
mainly with these subjects have been inserted.
Of the desirability of the case method of study there remains little doubt.
The cases furnish the background for critical comparative discussion both
with regard to the decisions reached by the courts and the basic principles
of substantive law involved. Thereby the students are trained in sound reading
and legal analysis, while, at the same time, they acquire an acquaintance with
the actual decisions of the courts.
When Dr. Josef Redlich of the University of Vienna investigated and
studied, in 1913, the case method of law teaching on behalf of the Carnegie
Foundation, he wrote as follows:
"As the method was developed, it laid the main emphasis upon precisely
that aspect of the training which the older text-book school entirely
neglected: the training of the student in intellectual independence, in indi-
t Assistant to the General Counsel, Treasury Department.
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vidual thinking, in digging out the principles through penetrating analysis
of the material found within separate cases: material which contains, all
mLxed in with one another, both the facts, as life creates them, which gener-
ate the law, and at the same time rules of the law itself, component parts of
the general system. In the fact that . . . it has actually accomplished this
purpose, lies the great success of the case method. For it really teaches the
pupil to think in the way that any practical lawyer-whether dealing with
written or with unwritten law, ought to and has to think."
Of recent years there has been some criticism of the case method technique,
chiefly by those who are not thoroughly grounded in the fundamental princi-
ples on which the system rests. The suggestion, for example, has been ad-
vanced that attempts have been made to compel it to do more than reasonably
can be expected. It has also been suggested that the too constant study of
cases gives a distorted perspective on the objects and purposes of law. In
the writer's opinion, after twenty-eight years of continuous law teaching, the
case method is the most effective and practical device for teaching law,
provided the cases are handled in the manner in which they should be.
Professor Campbell's book contains a number of interesting innovations,
particularly the use of a great number of hypothetical questions. For example:
most case books contain a considerable number of cases dealing with the
important topic of Future Advances. Professor Campbell's book contains
one case on this topic, Ackerman v. Hunsickcr.1 Then, following this case,
appear five hypothetical questions with references to a number of authorities
which shed light on the problems contained in these hypothetical questions.
If the student rally is to study these questions, he must read the cases to
which reference is made. A serious doubt suggests itself at once whether
the library facilities of our law schools are adequate for this purpose. For
instance, reference is made to a case in the California Appellate Court Reports,
which is also reported in the Pacific 2d, unofficial. If a class contains one
hundred or more students, it may be difficult, if not quite impossible, for
the student to secure access to the case in the reports. Therefore, to the
writer, it would seem advisable to include more cases in the text, even though,
perhaps, fewer topics may be covered.
In some instances, the abbreviation of cases by Professor Campbell seems
over-accentuated. For instance: Mooney v. Byrne,- covers about a dozen
pages in the New York Court of Appeals Reports. It is recognized as a leading
case and is an outstanding instance of fine opinion writing by the late Judge
Vann. Professor Campbell cuts the case down to two pages. The question
at once suggests itself whether such abbreviation is not too ex-treme. In
Professor Kirchwey's collection, nine pages were devoted to this case, par-
ticularly because of the outstanding discussion of the maxim, "Once a mort-
gage, always a mortgage," which is omitted in Professor Campbell's collection.
It is also highly debatable whether the editor is justified in giving seventy-
seven pages of the book to reprinting a form of corporate mortgage.
The cases are well chosen, and there can be no doubt that the student
can acquire a thorough knowledge of the law of mortgages of real estate from
1. 85 N. Y. 43 (1881), quoted at 498.
2. 163 N. Y. 86 (1900).
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this collection, but it is obvious that the collection differs radically from the
classic type of Harvard Law School case book as originated by Langdell in
1871, and as so well developed later by Ames, Keener and Gray. It was
these men who actually determined the form and type of case book which
has been used so widely and effectively for so many years in our American
law schools. Whether the novelties and innovations which are recently being
injected in the teaching of law furnish a sound norm for legal instruction only
the future can disclose.
The practical efficiency of Professor Campbell's collection is greatly en-
hanced by a collection of articles relating to the subject of mortgages, a
complete table of cases, both in the text and footnotes, and a detailed index
referring to pages of text, footnotes and to problems.
I. MAURICE WORmSERt
New York City.
TRANSACTIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIIGAN,
1805-1824. Ann Arbor, Mich., University of Michigan Press. 1925, 1938,
4 vols. Pp. liv, 632; 515; xliii, 755; 621. $30.00.
THIS series aims to make available to students the law reports and other
legal records of Michigan prior to the first regular published reports of 1843
and the chancery cases of 1836. In its first four volumes, the series has ad-
vanced down to the year 1824. Volume One contains the first journal of the
Supreme Court of the Territory of Michigan, 1805-1814, including a number
of opinions, admissions to the bar, naturalization proceedings, court rules,
grand jury proceedings, etc. The second volume comprises selected papers
from the file of the court, Judge Witherell's docket, and a calendar of miscel-
laneous papers. This calendar is continued down to 1825 in the third volume
which also contains the reports, 1819-1820, of James Duane Doty, clerk of
court, and republishes the notes of trials, arguments, and decisions, 1822-
1823, which had appeared in the contemporary Detroit Gazette. The fourth
volume, including the chancery journal, 1819-1825, a digest and table of
court rules, and other miscellaneous tables brings the journal of the court
to 1825. It is perhaps significant that prefacing each account of a case which
appeared in the Gazette was a quotation from King Lear:
"A man may see how this world goes with no eyes. Look with thine ears;
see how yon Justice rails upon yon simple thief. Hark in thine ear--change
places; and handy-dandy, which is the Justice which the Thief?"
The regularity with which this quotation is repeated in the columns of that
paper would seem to indicate that some of the inhabitants of Michigan Terri-
tory still held a pretty low opinion of the judiciary. Assuredly, the conduct
tProfessor of Law, Fordham University.
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of the courts in early territorial times was hardly conducive to creating favor-
able public opinion.'
Apart from matters of jurisdiction and court procedure, the published text
offers much illumination on the subject of the reception of the English common
law and the sources of legislation for Michigan Territory. As regards the
first, these volumes evidence a large-scale reception of English law. An act
of 1795 declaring the common law of England and certain British statutes
to be in force was patterned after a Virginia statute of 1776, which that
state had, as a matter of fact, repealed in 1792. Great deference to the common
law is evidenced in these four volumes. For example, to support the view
that a judge might act in a criminal case although he may have been injured
by the defendant's conduct, nine English authorities were cited (If, 339). The
common law is authority for the issuance of writs of mandamus (I, 504), and
throughout pleadings are construed in closq observance of conmon law models.
In holding that an arrest on Sunday on a civil process was illegal (111, 431),
judge Woodward followed the view according to which the writings of the
Church fathers and the Church constitutions were binding insofar as they
determined principles of ecclesiastical law applicable in England. oVodward's
intensive research in theological history testified to a tacit accord with the
doctrine held in some seaboard states, establishing Christianity and the canon
law as part of the common law which had been transplanted to the American
colonies.
It is significant that in Ohio, another state formed out of the Northwest
Territory, this doctrine was categorically rejected.2 It is not unlikely, hov-
ever, that, since the defendant in the case before Woodward was the Earl of
Selkirk, charged with the seizure of a Michigan resident, the jurist sought
to rationalize a judgment in which diplomatic considerations were determin-
ing. Such considerations were still uppermost, as sources of friction in this
area had not been eliminated with the termination of the Second War with
Britain. British constitutional and statutory privileges were also resorted to
by Judge Sibley in seeking an answer to the query: "How far a member of
Congress may claim Privilege from Arrest." In the case in question, one
Richard, a Catholic priest elected delegate to Congress in 1823, was confined
to debtor's prison in between sessions of Congress and was required to post
bond that he would keep within prison limits. This he breached in order
to attend a session of Congress. But the court denied the privilege claimed
in this case on grounds set forth in 2 Strange 989 that the writ of privilege
was unusual, "not issued without strong reasons and then with great care
and much circumspection" (II, 119).
1. For the general breakdown of territorial government in the first decade of the
19th century, see the illuminating account by Francis S. Philbrick, Lazes of the l:dal.a
Territory, 18o-18o9 (1930) 31 ILT. HisT. COLL
2. The Ohio ruling was based on an interpretation of a provision of the qtate con-
stitution guaranteeing religious liberty and prohibiting preferential treatment to any
church-phraseology identical with the constitution of Pennsylhania, in which state a
contrary ruling was upheld. Compare Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio 387 (:;.s.) (1853) with
Zeissweiss v. James, 63 Pa. 465 (1870).
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Any inference that there was a servile imitation of common law at all times
would be grossly unfair, however. Thus, the early common law rule against
body executions in civil cases was held to be no longer applicable on the
ground that it had never been in force in this country; the court therefore
sustained the issuance of alias ca.sa. in civil cases (III, 454). An important
source of revision and modification of the common law was the legislation of
the seaboard states. The Ordinance of 1787 provided that laws adopted in
the Northwest Territory "be not repugnant, but as conformable as may be
to those of the original States, or of some one or more of them." The courts
interpreted this provision, which paralleled the restriction in the colonial
charters that no laws be made repugnant to the laws of England, as per-
mitting the adoption of laws from different states, and such was the common
practice in both the Indiana and Michigan Territories.
As regards equity, the Territory in the first period did not set up courts
parallel to the English model, but followed such states as Massachusetts, where
equitable remedies were dispensed in the courts of common law in common
law actions and largely through common law forms. In 1819 equity matters
and causes of divorce and alimony were placed on a separate docket. This
separation was done to resolve doubts which had arisen as to the existence
of a chancery jurisdiction. A challenge of such authority would have under-
mined titles to many valuable tracts of land affected by chancery decrees.
Indiana Territory had already set up a separate chancery court.
Professor Blume has done an exemplary job of inventorying, collating and
editing the papers and journal of the court and of Justices Woodward and
Sibley. The index might serve as a model for other legal records and publi-
cations. There are arid stretches in these volumes that make one question at
times whether publication of the record of this court might not have been
reduced considerably in bulk without loss of vital material. Certainly this is
true of the calendar. I can see no gain in publishing portions of records
which were clearly indicated in the original as sections to be deleted. To do
so smacks of pedantry, and is certainly not reproducing the intent of the
writer, which, after all, should be the first aim of an editor. Volumes III
and IV, for the purpose of indexing, have also been numbered as I and II.
This causes some confusion. However, these are small details which should
not detract from a proper appreciation of a large-scale enterprise whose value
has been abundantly demonstrated in the four volumes thus far published.
RICHARD B. MORRIS t
New York City.
tProfessor of History, College of the City of New York.
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